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Abstract
We present a consumption-based model that explains the equity premium puzzle through
two channels. First, because of borrowing constraints, the shareholder cannot completely
diversify his income risk and requires a sizable risk premium on stocks. Second, because
of limited stock market participation, the precautionary saving demand lowers the risk-free
rate but not stock return and generates a substantial liquidity premium. Our model also
replicates many other salient features of the data, including the ﬁrst two moments of the
risk-free rate, excess stock volatility, stock return predictability, and the unstable relation
between stock volatility and the dividend yield.
Keywords: limited stock market participation, borrowing constraints, uninsurable in-
come risk, equity premium puzzle, excess volatility, stock return predictability, leverage
eﬀect.
JEL number: C68, E21, G10.1 Introduction
Empirical evidence documented in the past two decades has challenged the conventional wis-
dom about ﬁnancial markets. Fama and French (1989) ﬁnd that stock return is predictable.
Shiller (1981) shows that stock prices are too volatile to be justiﬁed by the subsequent move-
ment in dividends; Schwert (1989) also claims that large variations in stock volatility cannot
be accounted for by stock valuation models. Mehra and Prescott (1985) argue that the
consumption-based capital asset pricing model (CAPM) cannot explain the large observed
equity premium. These puzzles or anomalies seem to suggest that stocks are not priced by
the fundamentals stressed in the frictionless neoclassical models.
In this paper, we show that adding three market frictions–—(1) limited stock market
participation, (2) uninsurable income risk, and (3) borrowing constraints–—to an otherwise
standard model explains these puzzling phenomena in a coherent way.1 Speciﬁcally, we
analyze an inﬁnite horizon economy inhabited by two (types of) agents: Only one agent
holds stocks and receives dividends, while both agents receive labor income. Agents trade
one-period discount bonds with each other to diversify income risk; however, such insurance
is imperfect because of borrowing constraints. The model is calibrated using the income
process estimated by Heaton and Lucas (1996), and the simulation matches the data well
under reasonable parameterization. First, we replicate the ﬁrst two moments of the risk-free
rate, stock return, the equity premium, the long-term bond return, and the price-dividend
ratio, as well as their autocorrelations and crosscorrelations obtained from the data. Second,
consistent with Fama and French (1989), the price-dividend ratio and the term premium
forecast stock return in simulated data. Third, we duplicate Cochrane’s (1991) volatility test,
which shows that most variations in the price-dividend ratio are explained by movements in
1These frictions have been well documented in the empirical literature, e.g., see Mankiw and Zeldes (1991)
and Vissing-Jorgensen (1998) for limited stock market participation and Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoﬀ
(1996) for uninsurable income risk and borrowing constraints.
1expected stock return, but not by movements in dividends.2
We generate a large equity premium through two channels. First, because of borrowing
constraints, the shareholder cannot completely diversify his income risk and his consumption
is more volatile and more positively related to stock return than aggregate consumption. As
a result, the shareholder requires a sizable risk premium on stocks. This mechanism, which
has been emphasized in the empirical literature, e.g., Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Vissing-
Jorgensen (1998), is similar to the limited stock market participation model by Basak and
Cuoco (1998). Second, uninsurable income risk and borrowing constraints–—as shown by the
early authors, e.g., Telmer (1993) and Heaton and Lucas (1996)–—generate a precautionary
saving demand for tradable assets such as one-period discount bonds and thus lower the risk-
free rate. However, the precautionary saving demand does not lower stock return because of
limited stock market participation. Such an asymmetry between stocks and bonds generates
a substantial liquidity premium, which allows us to adopt a reasonable calibration for the
shareholder’s consumption.3 To our best knowledge, the second mechanism is innovative
and warrants further discussion below.
In our model, we generate a liquidity premium because stocks and bonds are not always
priced by the same pricing kernel. In particular, while stocks are priced by the shareholder’s
intertemporal marginal rates of substitution (IMRS), bonds are determined by the IMRS
of the unconstrained agent(s) or the maximum of the two agents’ IMRS. Given that the
former is lower and more volatile than the latter if borrowing constraints are occasionally
2Campbell and Cochrane (1999) show that a habit formation model can also replicate these features of the
data. However, in their model, there is a monotonic relation between stock volatility and the price-dividend
ratio, which is at odds with empirical evidence by Schwert (1989), who ﬁnds an unstable relation between
the two variables. As a result, the habit formation model implies a leverage eﬀect much stronger than that
in the data. In contrast, stock volatility is a U-shaped function of the price-dividend ratio and the leverage
eﬀect is moderate in our model.
3The volatility of the shareholder’s consumption growth is 6.6 percent at an annual frequency in our
baseline model, which is consistent with that reported by Vissing-Jorgensen (1998) using the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX). However, it should be noted that, as argued by Brav, Constantinides, and
Geczy (2002), a large portion of the consumption volatility in CEX might be due to measurement error.
Nevertheless, our number is much smaller than the 11.2 percent used by Basak and Cuoco (1998).
2binding, stock return is high and volatile while the risk-free rate is low and smooth, as
observed in the data. This mechanism distinguishes our model from the early literature.4
Intuitively, given that dividends are smooth in the data, if stocks and bonds are priced by
the same pricing kernel, their returns should have similar mean and variance. For example,
if both agents hold stocks, Heaton and Lucas (1996) show that uninsurable income risk and
borrowing constraints cannot produce a sizable equity premium because they lower both
stock return and the risk-free rate. Similarly, Basak and Cuoco (1998) ﬁnd that limited
stock market participation can generate a large risk price if the shareholder’s consumption
is volatile because of high leverage; however, their model also implies a volatile risk-free rate
because it is always determined by the shareholder’s IMRS.
Allen and Gale (1994) and Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) have emphasized the impor-
tant eﬀect of liquidity on asset prices. Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002) and
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001) have shown that the lack of intergeneration risk
sharing might lead to limited stock market participation and thus helps explain the equity
premium puzzle. However, these authors do not fully characterize the liquidity eﬀect in a
dynamic setting, as in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present a heterogeneous agent
model in section 2 and discuss numerical solutions in section 3. The simulation results from
the baseline model are presented in section 4, and we conduct the robustness check in section
5. Section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 A Limited Stock Market Participation Model
In an exchange economy, there is one perishable consumption good and there are two types
of agents of inﬁnite life horizons. We use index i =1 ,2 to indicate the representative agent
4However, this approach has been (implicitly) widely adopted in the empirical literature; for example,
the risk factors for stocks are diﬀerent from the risk factors for bonds.
3of each type. These agents receive stochastic labor income Li,t,i=1 ,2 and t ∈ [0,∞) by
supplying labor inelastically; the total labor income is Lt = L1,t + L2,t. Because of moral
hazard, they cannot write contracts contingent on the realization of their labor income; thus,
labor income is uninsurable. There is alsoat r e et h a tp r o d u c e sas t o c h a s t i cd i v i d e n dDt,
t ∈ [0,∞). The tree is endowed to agent 1 (shareholder) at time t =0 , and he is not allowed
to sell it. The aggregate endowment Yt is the sum of total labor income and dividend income,
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. We assume that Xt follows a stationary Markov process, which will be discussed in
the next section. In the absence of insurance markets, both agents hedge income risk only
through borrowing or lending against each other in a one-period discount bond market. Such
a risk-sharing scheme, however, is limited by borrowing constraints: Bi,t ≥ Bi,t,w h e r eBi,t
is the outstanding debt of agent i and Bi,t is his borrowing limit. Bi,t is positive (negative)
if agent i has a long (short) position in the bond market and Bi,t is always negative. We
assume that there is no outside bond supply and the net bond supply is zero:
B1,t + B2,t =0 . (1)
The intertemporal budget constraints of agents 1 and 2 are described by equations (2)
and (3), respectively. Pt is the equilibrium price of the one-period discount bond at time
t that pays one unit of consumption good at time t +1 , Ps
t is the stock price at time t,
Ci,t is the consumption of agent i at time t,a n dS1
t+1( S1
t) is the stockholding of agent 1
at time t +1(t). Because of limited stock market participation, stocks do not enter the
budget constraints of agent 2 (nonshareholder). It should also be noted that, in equilibrium,
because shareholders can trade stocks only among themselves, they always hold the same
4amount of stocks as in Lucas (1978) or S1
t+1 = S1
t for t ∈ [0,∞).
PtB1,t+1 + Ps
t S1
t+1 + C1,t+ ≤ B1,t + Ps
t S1
t + L1,t + D1,t
B1,t+1 ≥ B1,t+1
, 0 ≤ t<∞ (2)
PtB2,t+1 + C2,t ≤ B2,t + L2,t
B2,t+1 ≥ B2,t+1
, 0 ≤ t<∞ .( 3 )





tU(Ci,t)|Ω0],i=1 ,2 ,( 4 )
where E is an expectation operator conditional on information set Ω0, which includes all
information available at time t =0 . β is the time preference and U(·) is the instantaneous
utility function. In this paper, we use a power utility function as deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 5 ) ,i n




,i fγ > 0 and γ 6=1
log(C),i f γ =1 .
(5)
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions, which determine the equilibrium bond price, are
described in equation (6). β
U0(Ci,t+1)
U0(Ci,t)









0 ≤ t<∞,i =1 ,2 .
(6)
Because of limited stock market participation, the stock price, Ps
t , is determined only by the








|Ωt], 0 ≤ t<∞ .( 7 )
Equation (6) indicates that the IMRS are not equalized across two agents when borrowing
constraints are binding. More importantly, bonds are priced by the IMRS of the non-
shareholder and stocks are priced by the IMRS of the shareholder when the shareholder is
constrained. As shown in log-linear approximation below, this mechanism is important in
explaining the equity premium puzzle.






















). We use lowercase letters to denote
log variables throughout. If the conditional joint distribution of consumption growth and
asset returns is log-normal, the conditional risk-free rate deﬁned by equation (6) and the
conditional stock return deﬁn e db ye q u a t i o n( 7 )c a nb er e w r i t t e na se q u a t i o n s( 8 )a n d( 9 ) ,
respectively.5 r
f
i,t+1 is the shadow risk-free rate priced by agent i’s IMRS, gi,t+1 is the rate
of consumption growth, and σ2
i,t+1 is its variance. σ2
s,t+1 is the variance of stock return and
σs1,t+1 is the covariance between the shareholder’s consumption growth and stock return.
Equation (8) shows that the equilibrium risk-free rate r
f
t+1 should be low and smooth because
it is the minimum of the two shadow risk-free rates. On the other hand, equation (9)
shows that stock return is determined only by the shareholder’s IMRS and, therefore, is
relatively high and volatile. Substitution of equation (8) into equation (9) gives the equity
p r e m i u ma si ne q u a t i o n( 1 0 ) ,w h i c hh a st w oc o m p o n e n t s . T h eﬁrst component, γσs1,t+1,
is the risk premium in the standard consumption-based CAPM. The second component,
5It should be noted that, although log-linear approximation is helpful for illustration purposes, the ap-







2,t+1}, which is non-negative and is strictly positive when the shareholder
is constrained, can be thought of as a liquidity premium because it reﬂects the fact that the
shareholder cannot use stocks to buﬀer income shocks:
r
f































2,t+1} .( 1 0 )
We want to emphasize that limited stock market participation plays an important role
in resolving the equity premium puzzle. If both agents hold stocks as in Heaton and Lucas
(1996), the agent who is constrained in the bond market should also be constrained in the
stock market. As a result, income risk and borrowing constraints lower both the risk-free
rate and stock return through a precautionary saving demand and their model is unable
to produce a sizable equity premium. However, limited stock market participation alone
cannot explain all the asset pricing phenomena either. For example, in the model by Basak
and Cuoco (1998), there are no borrowing constraints and stocks and bonds are priced by
the shareholder’s IMRS, in particular, r
f
1,t+1 is always equal to r
f
2,t+1. Because of limited
stock market participation, the shareholder’s consumption could be much more volatile than
aggregate consumption, which generates a large risk premium, γσs1,t+1. However, volatile
consumption also implies a volatile risk-free rate, which is at odds with the data. In contrast,






2,t+1} accounts for a signiﬁcant portion of
the equity premium, the risk premium γσs1,t+1 need not be very large or the shareholder’s
consumption need not be extremely volatile in our model. Moreover, the risk-free rate is
7priced by the IMRS of the nonconstrained agent(s) and is thus relatively smooth in our
model, even though the shareholder’s consumption is relatively volatile.
Long-term bonds do not enter the model directly. As an approximation, we assume that
there is a consol paying one unit of consumption good in each period and that its price is
determined through auction. If the supply is zero, the price of the consol Pc
t is given by
equation (11) below, where Pc
i,t is the shadow consol price determined by agent i’s IMRS.






− 1 and the log
return is rc










. Equation (11) shows that, like the
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Finally, equations (1), (2), (3), and (6), along with the goods market clearing condition
equation (12) below, deﬁne the equilibrium of our model economy:
C1,t + C2,t = L1,t + L2,t + D1,t .( 1 2 )
3 Numerical Solutions and Calibration
The model does not have an analytical solution because the bond holdings are an endogenous
state variable, which changes over time. We solve the model numerically using the method
developed by Telmer (1993). First, we discretize the exogenous state variables of the vector
Xt and the endogenous state variable B1,t to approximate the continuous state spaces by
ﬁnite grids.6 Then we calculate the policy functions of each state by iterating the Euler
6B1,t is a suﬃcient statistic for the bond market because the net bond supply is zero, or B1,t +B2,t =0 .
8equation (6) along with the equations (1), (2), (3), and (12), recursively. Last, we feed the
model with simulated income processes to generate artiﬁcial time series of asset prices.
Heaton and Lucas (1996) assume that the vector Xt follows a ﬁrst-order VAR process as
in equation (13), where µ is a vector of intercepts, Λ is a matrix of slopes, Θ is a matrix of
coeﬃcients, and εt is a vector of i.i.d. shocks that have standard normal distributions and
are orthogonal to each other.
Xt = µ + ΛXt−1 + Θεt .( 1 3 )
Heaton and Lucas estimate equation (13) using the annual National Income and Product
Account (NIPA) data and the Panel Study of Income Dynamic (PSID) data and then use
Tauchen and Hussey’s (1991) quadrature method to approximate the estimated income pro-
cess with an eight-state (two grids for each state variable) Markov process.
In this paper, we adopt Heaton and Lucas’ (1996) eight-state income process. Moreover,
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) report that only 25 percent of US households own stocks and
that they receive higher labor income than nonshareholders. Therefore, we assume that the
shareholder on average receives 30 percent of the total labor income and the nonshareholder
gets the remainder, 70 percent, in the baseline model. The simulated income process of the
baseline model is reported in equation (14)7:
µ =































7We report only the shareholder’s labor income in equation (14). The nonshareholder’s labor income
process is similar to, but less volatile than that of the shareholder in the baseline model. In particular,
the volatility of annual income growth is 16.1 percent and 11.0 percent for the shareholder and the non-
shareholder, respectively.
9Finally, we assume that the borrowing limit Bi,t is proportional to aggregate income
Yt and the ratio BC = −
Bi,t
Yt
is constant over time. This is a standard assumption in the








the value of −BC, BC, or 1240 grids evenly spaced over the interval [−BC, BC].
4 Baseline Model
The parameterization of the baseline model is listed in the table below. It should be noted
that the frequency is annual in the simulation. We assume that, on average, dividends ac-
count for 15 percent of aggregate income as in Heaton and Lucas (1996), and the shareholder
receives 30 percent of total labor income. The relative risk aversion coeﬃcient, γ,i se q u a l
to 3, and the time preference, β, is set to be 0.99. Finally, we assume that each agent can
borrow up to 10 percent of aggregate income. We want to stress that the assumption about
borrowing constraints is not unrealistic: In the baseline model, both the shareholder and the
nonshareholder can still diversify most income risk by borrowing and the volatility of their
consumption growth is close to those reported by Vissing-Jorgensen (1998). It also should
be noted that one shareholder can borrow three times as much as what one nonshareholder






15% 30% 3 0.99 10%
We simulate the income process 50,000 times and use the last 20,000 realizations to
calculate the relevant statistics, which are then compared with their empirical counterparts.
Given its prominent role in the asset pricing literature, we ﬁrst show that our model helps
explain the equity premium puzzle. We then provide some economic intuitions by illustrating
10the dynamic of the model, and also show that our model is able to replicate many other salient
features of ﬁnancial market data. Finally, we discuss the social welfare loss associated with
the frictions incorporated in our model.
A. Means and Standard Deviations
The ﬁrst column of Table 1 reports the mean and the standard deviation of asset returns in
simulated data. The risk-free rate rf is 2.1 percent and the consol return rc is 2.0 percent,
compared with stock return r of 6.2 percent. Our model thus generates a large equity
premium r − rf of 4.2 percent but a small term premium rc − rf of —0.1 percent. Also, the
standard deviation of stock return is 15.4 percent, which is much higher than 4.7 percent for
the risk-free rate and 8.3 percent for the consol return. These numbers match their empirical
counterparts of various sample periods, which are reported in columns 2 through 4 of Table
1. The mean and the standard deviation of the price-dividend ratio match the data as well.
[Insert Table 1 here]
In the frictionless consumption-based CAPM, the unconditional equity premium is ap-








is Jensen’s inequality term and σcs is the covariance
between excess stock return and aggregate consumption. In simulated data, the covariance
between excess stock return and aggregate consumption growth is 6.1E-04 and implies a
relative risk aversion coeﬃcient of 88, compared with 3 used in the calibration.8 This is the
equity premium puzzle argued by Mehra and Prescott (1985). Equation (10) shows that their
formula is inappropriate for two reasons. First, we should use the shareholder’s consumption







2,t+1} is about 2.6 percent, which accounts for almost half of the equity
8It should be noted that, in our exchange economy, aggregate consumption is equal to aggregate income,
of which the growth rate has a mean of 1.8 percent and a standard deviation of 2.8 percent.
11premium in simulated data. As mentioned above, Heaton and Lucas (1996) cannot generate
a sizeable equity premium because both agents can hold stocks and thus there is no liquidity
premium in their model.
B. Dynamics of the Baseline Model
It helps to understand the economic intuitions of our model by looking at statistics con-
ditional on the normalized shareholder’s bond holding
B1,t
Yt




and it can take the value of −BC, BC, or any of 1240 grids evenly










= BC) or that the shareholder (nonshare-
holder) is constrained. Point 3 corresponds to the ﬁrst 124 grids immediate to −BC,p o i n t
4 is the next 124 grids, and so forth. The vertical axis is the fraction of the time that
B1,t
Yt
falls into these corners or subintervals. We ﬁnd that both agents hit the borrowing limit
quite frequently: 17 percent for the shareholder and 20 percent for the nonshareholder.
[Insert Figures 1-9 here]




. dy1 (dy2) and dc1 (dc2) are the shareholder’s (nonshareholder’s) income and
consumption growth rates, respectively. At point 1, the shareholder has to reduce his con-
sumption at time t because he cannot borrow any more after a string of bad income shocks.
However, his expected consumption growth rate from time t to t +1is high because he
anticipates a high income growth rate given that income shocks are transitory. Meanwhile,
the nonshareholder’s consumption at time t i sh i g hb e c a u s eh ec a n n o ts a v ea n ym o r e .H i s
expected consumption growth rate from time t to t+1, however, is low because his expected
income growth rate is low. Conversely, the expected consumption growth is low (high) for
12the shareholder (nonshareholder) at point 12, when the nonshareholder’s borrowing con-
straints are binding. For the other points, two agents can completely diversify income risk
and, therefore, have the same consumption growth rates. Although borrowing constraints
are relatively stringent, both agents can still diversify most income risk by borrowings. As
shown in Figure 3, conditional income is much more volatile than conditional consumption
for both agents. Also, the unconditional volatility of the consumption growth rate is 6.6
percent for the shareholder and is 4.9 percent for the nonshareholder, compared with the
income volatility of 16.1 percent for the shareholder and 11.0 percent for the nonshareholder.
As mentioned in the introduction, the shareholder’s consumption volatility is close to its em-
pirical counterpart reported by Vissing-Jorgensen (1998). It should also be noted that the




because neither agents can diversify income shocks at point 1 and point
12. As we show below, this also generates a U-shaped stock volatility.




2) is the shareholder’s (nonshareholder’s) shadow risk-free rate as de-
ﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 8 )a n drf is the equilibrium risk-free rate obtained from simulated data.




2). The risk-free rate is
low at point 1 (12) because it is determined by the nonshareholder’s (shareholder’s) IMRS,
which is low, as shown in Figure 2. For the other points, the risk-free rate is ﬂat and relatively
high. The conditional consol return displays a similar pattern to that of the risk-free rate
and is not reported here. In Figure 5, r1 is the shareholder’s shadow stock return as deﬁned
in equation (9) and r is stock return obtained from simulated data. These two variables
a r ea p p r o x i m a t e l ye q u a lt oe a c ho t h e rb e c a u s es t o c k sa r ea l w a y sp r i c e db yt h es h a r e h o l d e r ’ s
IMRS. Stock return is high at point 1 because the shareholder’s consumption is expected
to rise and he has little motivation to save. Conversely, stock return is low at point 12 be-
cause the shareholder wants to save for the future decline in his income. Stock return is ﬂat
and moderate at the other points when the shareholder can perfectly diversify income risk.
13Overall, unlike the risk-free rate, borrowing constraints do not lower stock return on average
and our model can thus generate a sizable equity premium. This point is further illustrated
in Figure 6: premium is the equity premium obtained from simulated data, and premium1
is the shadow equity premium deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the shareholder’s shadow





in equation (9). premium is approximately equal to premium1 e x c e p ta tp o i n t1 ,w h e r e
the IMRS are not equalized across two agents and the risk-free rate is determined by the







as shown in equation (10). It should be noted that, although the liquidity premium is im-
portant, it accounts for only about half of the equity premium in simulated data and the
remainder is explained by the risk premium. Similarly, Figure 7 shows that the Sharpe ratio
E(r − rf)
σ(r − rf)
spikes at point 1 and is ﬂat at the other points.




is skewed to the left, as expected. On the other hand, the price-dividend ratio is a mono-
tonically increasing function of
B1,t
Yt
, as shown in Figure 9. Together, our model predicts an
unstable relation between stock volatility and the price-dividend ratio: The two variables are
negatively (positively) correlated when the price-dividend ratio is high (low). This pattern
is consistent with empirical evidence documented by Schwert (1989) and below we further
discuss its implication for the leverage eﬀect. The conditional risk-free rate volatility is also
a U-shaped function of
B1,t
Yt
, although much smaller than stock volatility.
C. Autocorrelation
The lower panel of Table 2 reports the autocorrelation in the data. While the risk-free rate
rf is somewhat persistent, stock return r and excess stock return r − rf show small and
usually negative autocorrelation. Fama and French (1988) and Poterba and Summers (1988)
14also document a slow univariate mean-reversion in stock prices. This is demonstrated by the







w h i c hi sn e g a t i v ea n dd e c r e a s e sw i t ht h eh o r i z o n j. Moreover, Fama and French (1989) ﬁnd
that the price-dividend ratio
P
D
and the default premium DEF are more persistent than the
term premium TERM.9
[Insert Table 2 here]
The default premium DEF is not directly deﬁn e di no u rm o d e l ,a n dw eu s et h es h a r e -
holder’s outstanding debts B1,t as an approximation for it.10 In simulated data shown in
the upper panel of Table 2, both the price-dividend ratio
P
D
and the default premium DEF
are more persistent than the term premium TERM, which is deﬁned as the yield spread
between the consol and the risk-free rate. Also, the autocorrelation of the other variables
displays a similar pattern to that in the data.
D. Leverage Eﬀect
Christie (1982), among others, argues for a leverage eﬀect that stock prices are negatively
correlated with stock volatility.11 Following Campbell and Cochrane (1999), we use the
absolute value of excess stock return |rt+j −r
f
t+j| as a measure of stock volatility and report
its coeﬃcient of correlation with the log price-dividend ratio pt−dt in Table 3. The coeﬃcient
is indeed negative; however, the magnitude is rather small in both simulated and actual data.
In contrast, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) predict a much larger and much more persistent
9In Fama and French (1989), the default premium is deﬁned as the yield spread between Aaa bonds and
a bond portfolio; the term premium is deﬁned as the yield spread between long-term Aaa bonds and the
risk-free rate.
10Fama and French (1989) ﬁnd that the price-dividend ratio and the default premium are highly corre-
lated, with a coeﬃcient of correlation of 0.61 for the period 1927-1987 and 0.75 for the period 1941-1987.
Interestingly, these two variables have a coeﬃcient of correlation of 0.93 in simulated data.
11Guo and Whitelaw (2001), among others, suggest that a volatility feedback eﬀect may also explain the
negative relation between stock prices and volatility.
15leverage eﬀect, which is reproduced in the last row of Table 3. The reason for the diﬀerence
between the two models is as follows. Stock volatility decreases monotonically with the
price-dividend ratio in Campbell and Cochrane (1999); however, as shown in Figure 8, it is
an asymmetric U-shaped function of the price-dividend ratio in our model.
[Insert Table 3 here]
E. Long Horizon Predictability
Fama and French (1989) ﬁnd that the price-dividend ratio, the default premium, and the term
premium forecast stock return and the ﬁrst two variables have longer forecasting horizons
than the last one. The left column of Table 4 shows that our simulation replicates Fama and
French’s results. The price-dividend ratio
P
D
and the term premium TERM both predict
stock return.12 Also, while R2 increases with horizons for the price-dividend ratio, it peaks
after 2-3 years for the term premium.13 The default premium DEF, which is approximated
by the shareholder’s liquidity conditions B1,t in simulated data, exhibits the same pattern
as the price-dividend ratio in forecasting stock return and is not reported here.
R2 increases with horizons for the price-dividend ratio because the price-dividend ratio
tracks the liquidity component in conditional excess return, which is relatively persistent.
For example, when the shareholder is constrained, expected excess return is high. However,
because the labor income shock is persistent, the shareholder is likely to be constrained again
in the next period, and the realized excess return thus might be low. On the other hand, the
labor income shock is not permanent and the shareholder’s consumption eventually reverts
12Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) show that the consumption-wealth ratio, which is the error term of the
cointegration relation among aggregate consumption, labor income, and wealth, is a strong predictor of stock
return. In our simulated data, the coeﬃcient of correlation between the consumption-wealth ratio and the
price-dividend ratio is -0.99, and the two variables have very similar forecasting abilities for stock return.
13We do not report the empirical counterpart for the term premium in Table 4 because Fama and French
(1989) show that the term premium has predictive power for only 1-2 quarters, while the frequency of our
simulation is annual.
16to the trend level over a long horizon; accordingly, the realized excess return is high over the
long horizon.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Fama (1990) argues that variations in long-term rates are less extreme because the risk-
free rate is a mean-reverting process. In the baseline model, the standard deviation of the
yield on the consol is only 0.2 percent, compared with 4.7 percent for the risk-free rate.
Most variations in the term premium, therefore, come from innovations in the risk-free rate,
which in turn are primarily caused by innovations in aggregate income.14 In contrast, as
discussed above, the price-dividend ratio forecasts stock return because it tracks closely
the shareholder’s liquidity conditions, of which movements are explained by idiosyncratic
income shocks. Therefore, idiosyncratic income shocks and aggregate income shocks are
the two major economic forces that inﬂuence expected stock return in our model economy;
however, the former has much larger and much more persistent eﬀects on stock prices than
the latter does.
F. Volatility Test
Cochrane (1991) decomposes the variance of the price-dividend ratio into two parts–shocks
to expected stock return −
P∞
j=1 ρjcov(pt − dt,r t+j) and shocks to the dividend growth
P∞
j=1 ρjcov(pt − dt,∆dt+j),a si ne q u a t i o n( 1 5 )b e l o w ,w h e r eρ =
P/D
1+P/D
and P/D is the
unconditional price-dividend ratio.








jcov(pt − dt,r t+j) (15)
14As shown in equation (13), our model economy is perturbed by three shocks: dividend shocks, aggregate
income shocks, and idiosyncratic income shocks. Because dividends move closely with aggregate income, the
model dynamic is primarily driven by aggregate income shocks and idiosyncratic income shocks. In simulated
data, while the former explains 10 percent of the variations in the risk-free rate, the latter accounts for only
1 percent; a large fraction is explained by its own lags.
17The volatility test mirrors Shiller’s (1981) excess volatility puzzle: As shown in Table 5,
shocks to expected return account for most variations of the price-dividend ratio in the data.
Our model replicates this feature well. While shocks to expected stock return account for 95
percent of variations in the price-dividend ratio, shocks to dividends explain only 1 percent
in the simulation.
[Insert Table 5 here]
G. Social Welfare Loss
In this subsection, we deﬁne and calculate the social welfare loss associated with the mar-
ket frictions analyzed in this paper from the perspective of a social planner, who cares
about the shareholder and the nonshareholder equally. It should be noted that both agents
can completely diversify income risk through trading on the stock market if there is no
limited stock market participation. In this case, the outcome of the decentralized econ-
omy is Pareto optimal and is the same as that of the social planner economy; the as-




tU((1 − α)Ct)],w h e r eα (1 − α)i s
the average ratio of the shareholder’s (nonshareholder’s) income to aggregate income and
Ct is aggregate consumption, which is equal to aggregate income in our exchange econ-















where λ is the fraction of aggregate consumption that the social planner is willing to spend
on eliminating the market frictions. Also, we deﬁne the welfare gain λ1 of the nonshare-
holder for becoming a shareholder as E
P
[β
tU((1 − α)Ct)] = E
P
[β
tU((1 + λ1)C2,t)].T h e
shareholder also beneﬁts from the removal of the stock market participation restriction: The







18We calculate the welfare loss or gain through a grid search using simulated data and ﬁnd
that, in the baseline model, λ is about 1.24 percent. Also, λ1 is about 0.47 percent for the
nonshareholder and λ2 is about 1.61 percent for the shareholder. The shareholder beneﬁts
more than the nonshareholder does because the income of the former is more volatile than
that of the latter in the baseline model.15 Admittedly, the social welfare loss is relatively
large. However, it is at least qualitatively consistent with empirical evidence, e.g., Hayashi,
Altonji, and Kotlikoﬀ (1996) and many others. More importantly, some recent research pro-
vides direct support to our model. Using shareholders’ consumption from PSID data, Jacobs
(1999) reports overwhelming rejection of the Euler equation for the risk-free rate, but not
for stock market return. Also, Heaton and Lucas (2000) ﬁnd that proprietary income risk,
which is borne mostly by shareholders, has signiﬁcant eﬀects on stock prices.
5 Alternative Speciﬁcations
In this section, we calibrate the model using diﬀerent parameters and income processes. In
general, our results are robust to reasonable variations in parameterization.
A. Borrowing Constraints
Our model predicts a large equity premium because the precautionary saving demand lowers
only the risk-free rate, not stock return. The more stringent the borrowing constraints are,
the larger the eﬀect of the precautionary saving demand on the equity premium is. This
is clearly demonstrated in Table 6. As BC increases, the percentage of the time that the
shareholder (F1)a n dt h en o n s h a r e h o l d e r( F2) are constrained decreases or their abilities to
15In Basak and Cuoco (1998), while the nonshareholder’s welfare improves, the shareholder’s welfare ac-
tually deteriorates if the restriction of limited stock market participation is removed. The diﬀerence between
their model and ours is explained by the fact that Basak and Cuoco (1998) do not consider idiosyncratic
income risk and borrowing constraints.
19diversify income risk increases. As a result, the risk-free rate Rf increases and stock return
R decreases; the equity premium R −Rf disappears when borrowing constraints become so
loose that both agents can perfectly diversify income risk.
[Insert Table 6 here]
B. Relative Risk Aversion Coeﬃcient
Changing γ has two opposite eﬀects on the risk-free rate. First, as shown in Table 7, the
frequency of binding constraints goes up for both agents when the relative risk aversion
coeﬃcient γ increases because, with higher γ, agents prefer smoother consumption. In other
words, higher γ leads to a stronger precautionary saving motive and thus a lower risk-free
rate. Second, in the power utility function, γ is the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. Therefore, higher γ implies a higher risk-free rate if the consumption growth
rate is ﬁxed. Overall, the risk-free rate ﬁrst increases then decreases with γ in Table 7.
Because the precautionary saving motive does not aﬀect stock return directly, stock return
increases monotonically with γ. The equity premium also increases with γ.
We also allow the shareholder to be more risk averse than the nonshareholder, as in Basak
and Cuoco (1998). We ﬁnd that such an asymmetry helps explain the equity premium puzzle.
For example, with the other parameters the same as in the baseline model, if γ is equal to
3 (1) for the shareholder (nonshareholder), our model generates an equity premium of 4.5
percent for BC =3 0 % , compared with 1.5 percent reported in Table 6. The intuition
is as follows. When the shareholder is constrained, the nonshareholder, who has a lower
γ and thus a higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution, is more willing to substitute
consumption intertemporally, accepts a lower r i s k - f r e er a t er e l a t i v et ot h eb a s e l i n em o d e l .
Speciﬁcally, the asymmetry in preference ampliﬁes the liquidity premium and thus the equity
premium. Similarly, our model generates a smaller equity premium relative to the baseline
20if the shareholder is less risk averse than the nonshareholder. In this case, however, we
can always restore the equity premium by assuming more stringent borrowing constraints.
T h e r e f o r e ,h e t e r o g e n e o u sr i s kp r e f e r e n c ed o e sn o tq u a l i t a t i v e l ya ﬀect our results.
[Insert Table 7 here]
C. Dividend and Labor Income
In Table 8, we allow the dividend share
D
Y




deviate from those in the baseline model and ﬁnd that these modiﬁcations have no qualitative
eﬀects. These results should not be a surprise because our model generates a sizable equity
premium as long as the shareholder is occasionally constrained. Mankiw (1986) points out
that if labor income shocks are concentrated in the troughs of business cycles, the risk-free
rate should be lower than would be the case if these shocks are acyclical. To address this
issue, we calibrate the model using the cyclical labor income estimated by Heaton and Lucas
(1996) and the results are reported under the column Cyclical of Table 8. As expected, the
risk-free rate is lower in the cyclical model than in the baseline model; stock return and the
equity premium are also slightly higher. There is, however, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
t h eb a s e l i n em o d e la n dt h ec y c l i c a lm o d e l .
[Insert Table 8 here]
6C o n c l u s i o n
We ﬁnd that a combination of some well-documented market frictions explains the equity
premium puzzle. Our main innovation is that, in addition to the risk premium in the
standard model, shareholders also require a liquidity premium on stocks because of limited
stock market participation. Interestingly, the liquidity premium also sheds light on some
21ongoing controversies in the asset pricing literature. For example, because the liquidity
premium can be negatively related to the risk premium, we might ﬁnd a negative risk-
return relation in the data, which contradicts the CAPM. Nevertheless, our model suggests
a positive risk-return tradeoﬀ once we control for the liquidity premium; Guo (2002a) ﬁnds
that these implications are supported by the post-World War II data. Also, like Merton’s
(1973) intertemporal CAPM, our model highlights the inadequacy of the CAPM because
investment opportunities, e.g., conditional stock return and volatility, change over time. In
particular, given that past volatility and the price-dividend ratio forecast stock return and
volatility in our model, they should be included as risk factors in addition to market return
(Campbell (1993)). Indeed, Guo (2002b) ﬁnds that these factors help explain the cross
section of stock returns. We believe that the market frictions analyzed in this paper, given
their success in explaining the asset pricing phenomena, are important to understanding
many other related economic issues and warrant attention in future research.
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25Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations: Baseline Model and Data
Baseline Model 1871-1998 1871-1945 1946-1998
Mean
rf 2.1 2.4 2.9 1.6
r 6.2 6.9 6.4 7.6
r − rf 4.2 4.5 3.5 5.9
rc 2.0 2.2 2.9 1.2
rc − rf -0.1 -0.2 -0.0 -0.5
P
D 23.7 23.5 20.1 28.1
Standard Deviation
rf 4.7 9.4 10.6 8.0
r 15.4 18.4 17.9 19.1
r − rf 15.5 17.6 19.0 15.6
rc 8.3 11.7 10.9 12.7
rc − rf 7.2 5.8 3.7 8.0
P
D 6.0 7.9 4.8 8.9
rf is the risk-free rate; r is stock return; rc is the consol return in the model
as well as the long-term government bond return in data; P
D is the price-
dividend ratio. In columns 2-4, data of the risk-free rate, stock return, and
the price-dividend ratio were obtained from Robert Shiller at Yale University;
data of the long-term government bond were provided to us by Jack Wilson
at University of North Carolina. The price-dividend ratio is reported in level
and all other variables are reported in percentage. The frequency is annual.




rf 0.61 0.31 0.12 -0.01 0.01
r 0.00 -0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04
r − rf 0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 -0.04
P
D 0.80 0.61 0.45 0.21 0.08
DEF 0.87 0.67 0.47 0.31 0.12
TERM 0.60 0.31 0.12 -0.02 0.01 Pj
i=1 ρ(rt − r
f
t ,r t+i − r
f
t+i) 0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.18 -0.30
Data 1871-1998
rf 0.28 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.14
r -0.07 -0.15 0.09 -0.01 0.12
r − rf 0.03 -0.23 0.11 -0.14 0.15
P
D 0.75 0.56 0.55 0.40 0.40
DEF 0.74 0.61 0.34 0.42 0.46
TERM 0.46 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.06 Pj
i=1 ρ(rt − r
f
t ,r t+i − r
f
t+i) 0.03 -0.20 -0.09 -0.29 -0.10
DEF is the default premium and is approximated by shareholder’s bond hold-
ing B1,t in simulated data. TERM is the term premium and is deﬁned as










t+i. All other variables are deﬁned in the note of Table 1. In the lower
panel, the default premium and the term premium are reproduced from Table
1 of Fama and French (1989); all other variables are calculated from Shiller’s
data. The frequency is annual.




pt − dt,|rt+j − r
f
t+j| -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 -0.05
Data 1871-1998
pt − dt,|rt+j − r
f
t+j| -0.04 -0.01 -0.14 -0.03 0.03
Campbell and Cochrane (1999)
pt − dt,|rt+j − r
f
t+j| -0.49 -0.42 -0.37 -0.28 -0.21
pt − dt is the log price-dividend ratio and |rt+j − r
f
t+j| is the absolute value of
excess stock return. Shiller’s data are used to calculate the empirical counter-
parts in the middle panel. Table 4 of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is also
reproduced for comparison. The frequency is annual.
28Table 4: Long-Horizon Predictability: Baseline Model and Data
Horizon Baseline Model Data 1871-1998 Pj
1(rt+j − r
f
t+j)=a + b ∗ (pt − dt)
slope R2 slope R2
1 -0.17 0.07 -0.09 0.02
2 -0.32 0.14 -0.25 0.08
3 -0.46 0.19 -0.31 0.09
5 -0.66 0.25 -0.54 0.17




t+j)=a + b ∗ Term
slope R2
10 . 6 3 0 . 0 3
21 . 0 1 0 . 0 4
31 . 1 9 0 . 0 4
51 . 1 1 0 . 0 2
70 . 8 5 0 . 0 1
pt −dt is the log price-dividend ratio and Termis the term premium, deﬁned
as the yield spread between the consol and the one-period discount bond in
simulated data. We use overlapped data in the regressions. Shiller’s data are
used for the empirical counterparts. The frequency is annual.
29Table 5: Volatility Test: Baseline Model and Data
Expected Return Dividend
Baseline Model 95 1
Data 101 -10
Cochrane (1991) shows that the variance of the price-dividend ratio can be
decomposed into two parts,








jcov(pt − dt,r t+j).
The ﬁrst component is the variation caused by dividend shocks and the sec-
ond component is due to expected return shocks. Following Campbell and
Cochrane (1999), we use the ﬁrst 15 leads to calculate these statistics in simu-
lated data. The empirical counterparts are taken from Campbell and Cochrane
(1999). All the numbers are reported in percentage.
30Table 6: Changing Borrowing Constraints
BC Rf σ(Rf) Rσ (R) R − Rf σ(R − Rf) F1 F2
0.07 0.6 5.5 8.3 20.8 7.7 21.0 21.9 25.1
0.10 2.2 4.7 7.7 17.0 5.5 17.2 16.9 20.3
0.15 3.7 3.9 7.2 13.1 3.5 13.3 12.0 15.3
0.20 4.5 3.4 6.9 10.6 2.5 10.8 9.1 11.2
0.30 5.2 2.7 6.7 7.8 1.5 7.8 5.8 8.2
0.50 5.8 2.2 6.6 5.2 0.7 5.1 3.0 4.9
0.80 6.1 1.9 6.5 3.9 0.4 3.5 1.6 2.7
1.00 6.2 1.8 6.5 3.5 0.3 3.1 1.1 2.1
1.20 6.2 1.8 6.5 3.4 0.3 2.9 0.8 1.6
1.50 6.2 1.8 6.5 3.1 0.2 2.6 0.5 1.2
2.00 6.3 1.8 6.5 3.1 0.2 2.6 0.1 0.4
3.00 6.2 1.7 6.5 3.2 0.3 2.7 0.0 0.2
4.00 6.2 1.7 6.5 3.5 0.3 3.0 0.0 0.0
The speciﬁcations are the same as the baseline model, except the borrowing
constraints BC.A l lt h en u m b e r sa r er e p o r t e di np e r c e n t a g ea n dt h ef r e q u e n c y
is annual. F1 (F2) is the percentage of the time that the shareholder’s (non-
shareholder’s) borrowing constraints are binding.
31Table 7: Changing Relative Risk Aversion Coeﬃcient
γR f σ(Rf) Rσ (R) R − Rf σ(R − Rf) F1 F2
1 1.7 1.6 3.5 6.8 1.9 6.9 16.7 18.4
2 2.1 3.2 5.5 12.0 3.4 12.2 16.8 19.4
3 2.2 4.7 7.7 17.2 5.5 17.2 16.9 20.3
4 2.1 6.3 10.0 21.8 7.9 21.8 17.0 21.7
5 1.9 7.7 12.2 26.0 10.3 26.0 17.2 22.6
The speciﬁcations are the same as in the baseline model except the relative risk
aversion coeﬃcient γ. All the numbers are reported in percentage and the fre-
quency is annual. F1 (F2) is the percentage of the time that the shareholder’s
(nonshareholder’s) borrowing constraints are binding.















Rf 2.2 .6 1.7 4.2 -1.0 1.9
R 7.7 8.9 8.1 7.1 8.5 8.3
R − Rf 5.5 8.3 6.4 2.9 9.5 6.4
P
D 23.7 25.2 24.3 23.1 24.4 24.0
Standard Deviation
Rf 4.7 6.2 5.2 3.7 5.9 7.0
R 17.1 24.6 19.8 12.1 22.3 20.8
R − Rf 17.3 24.3 19.7 12.1 23.2 21.4
P
D 6.0 8.4 6.9 4.4 7.3 6.5
The speciﬁcations are the same as the baseline model except the dividend
share in columns 2-3, the shareholder’s labor income share in columns 4-5,
and cyclical income shocks in column 6. The price-dividend ratio is reported
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Figure 9: Conditional Price-Dividend Ratio
38